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ccess to equity capital is a critical component of business entrepreneurship. 
Young companies lack the cash flows necessary for debt repayment. They need 
patient capital, such as equity and near-equity, to develop and get their products 
ready for market. As Barkley and Henry confirm in this issue of the Review, the 
creation and growth of such companies is the path to economic prosperity for many rural 
regions. It also is a means to economic opportunity for rural residents. 
Rural  economies,  however,  rarely  attract  traditional  venture  capital  (see  Lipper  and 
Moncrief in this issue). This is due in part to the structural impediments they pose for the 
traditional venture capital model. Because the primary driver of traditional venture capital 
is profit maximization, the industry tends to gravitate to geographies that maximize poten-
tial investment opportunities and minimize operating costs. Areas such as Silicon Valley in 
California and Route 128 in Massachusetts embody such geographies and consistently draw 
a disproportionate share of traditional venture dollars. 
Such geographies have a critical mass of potential investment opportunities and the 
supporting infrastructure in the form of technological, managerial, legal and financial exper-
tise necessary to take ideas to market. Their proximity to desirable quality-of-life amenities 
also enables these geographies to attract venture capitalists, who can minimize travel time 
and operating expenses by living near their investments. 
By contrast, rural geographies are characterized by limited deal flows and supporting 
infrastructures, and large distances that make oversight difficult. Because of these structural 
impediments, the venture capital that exists in rural areas tends to be developmental in 
nature. Unlike traditional venture capital, which has a primary objective of financial returns 
for investors, developmental venture capital is designed to foster both social and financial 
returns. In the case of rurally-focused developmental venture capital firms, the social returns 
are often in the form of economic growth, either general or specifically targeted at helping 
low-and moderate-income populations. 
Community development venture capital (CDVC) is one form of developmental venture 
capital that has evolved in rural areas. Like traditional venture capitalists, CDVC providers 
make equity and near-equity investments in small businesses.1 However, their investments 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW 15
1 Equity investments consist of preferred and common stock. Near-equity investments consist of debt that is convert-
ible to equity and debt with warrants, royalties or participation payments. Near-equity can be structured to act like 
equity, with deferred payments that give young firms the patient capital they need in their early years. are predicated on a company’s potential for high-quality job creation for low- and moderate-
income individuals as well as its likelihood of rapid economic growth. As a result of this 
dual-bottom-line, CDVCs are willing to invest in companies in numerous industries, stages 
of development, and locations. This flexibility, as well as the operating model that it has 
fostered, further differentiates CDVC funds from traditional venture capital, and makes this 
model particularly well suited to address the structural impediments that rural areas present.2 
The earliest community development venture capital funds, formed during the 1970s 
and 1980s, had a primarily rural focus. They included the Kentucky Highlands Investment 
Corporation (KHIC), Northeast Ventures, Coastal Ventures Limited Partnership, Develop-
ment Corporation of Austin, and the Minnesota Technology Corporation Investment Fund 
(MIN-Corp). While most of the subsequent CDVC funds targeted broader geographies, the 
industry also has seen the creation of new CDVC funds focused on the rural regions of Okla-
homa, New Mexico, Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, North and South Carolina, 
Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. 
The obstacle to growing more rurally-focused CDVC funds is this model’s need for 
subsidy. The present economic, political and normative environments seem hostile to overtly 
subsidy-based models, particularly those intended to benefit low- and moderate-income 
populations. This has limited both the growth of new CDVC funds and the capitalization 
levels of existing ones. This hostility must be overcome in order to foster the innovation and 
entrepreneurship that will enable rural areas to participate in the knowledge economy. 
The CDVC Model
In order to understand the CDVC model, it is helpful to contrast it with traditional 
venture capital. Although CDVCs differ from traditional venture capital funds in a number 
of ways, these differences all stem from CDVCs’ double-bottom line objective. The social 
bottom-line for rurally-focused CDVCs is their commitment to economically developing a 
particular non-metro geography. To do so, they must find ways to overcome the structural 
limitations such geographies present for venture capital investing. 
The first structural limitation of rural geographies is their lack of the supporting infra-
structure that venture capital requires. In particular, small populations often translate into 
few experienced company managers with the knowledge to guide young firms. CDVCs 
address this limitation with technical assistance, either directly from CDVC fund staff or 
indirectly from outside experts. In either case, this technical assistance translates into higher 
costs for the fund. 
Another structural limitation of rural geographies is a scarcity of high-quality deal flow. 
By definition, rural areas have smaller populations, which translate into fewer entrepreneurs 
and fewer firms. While traditional venture capitalists may review hundreds of potential 
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2 This section draws on the author’s ongoing research on community development venture capital. investments in order to select the most promising one, a venture fund operating in a rural 
geography may have only a few dozen investment options to consider. Additionally, the 
quality of their investment options may not be comparable to those reviewed by a traditional 
venture fund. 
One way that rurally-focused CDVC funds maximize their investment options is by 
investing in a broad range of industries. This differentiates them from traditional venture 
funds, which concentrate their investments in those technologically intensive sectors that 
offer the greatest promise for significant returns. As discussed by Barkley and Henry, such 
high-tech investments are particularly difficult to find in rural areas. Thus, most of the invest-
ments made by rurally-focused CDVC funds have been in lower-tech, primarily manufac-
turing firms. These investments lack the potential financial volatility, both positive and nega-
tive, of traditional venture, but meet the social objective of economic development and job 
creation. 
The lack of deal flow in rural areas also means CDVC funds must invest in companies at 
various levels of development. In particular, rural CDVC funds have had to “create deals” by 
investing in early-stage firms. Traditional venture capitalists are reluctant to make early stage 
investments because they are higher risk than those in firms that have demonstrated their 
market potential.3  Early stage investments also are more expensive for venture capitalists 
because they involve both longer timeframes and intensive oversight to develop a successful 
company. This can result in additional costs related to delayed exits – when the company can 
be sold to investors or another company. 
All venture capitalists must exit their investments in order to make a profit and free up 
capital for new investments. The longer it takes a venture fund to exit an investment, the 
more operating costs it accrues. Unless the longer holding time results in a higher exit price, 
it also translates into lower returns for the venture fund, which cannot re-invest the capital 
until it exits its original investment. 
In general, exits are critical to the ability of venture capitalists to make a profit. The 
majority of traditional venture funds make a profit by exiting a few investments so success-
fully that the returns are sufficient to offset losses on the rest of their portfolio. Such exits, 
whether by initial public offering or buy-out by another firm, are not uncommon when 
investing in the technologically-intensive industries favored by traditional venture funds. 
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3 Seed/start-up stage investments accounted for only 2.11 percent of all dollars invested by traditional venture 
capitalists in 2005 (PriceWaterhouse Moneytree 2006). While comparable figures are not available for CDVC funds, 
almost fifty percent of rural CDVC fund investments through the end of 2000 were in seed/start-up stage firms. 
Even these statistics understate the differences between CDVC and traditional venture capital funds because of the 
variation in how each defines seed/start-up stage investments. Rural -CDVC funds, for example, are willing to invest 
in business opportunities that they identify themselves and subsequently find entrepreneurs to help develop. By 
contrast, PriceWaterhouse Moneytree defines the Seed/Start-Up Stage investments for traditional venture funds as 
those in companies that usually have been in existence less than 18 months and have a concept or product under 
development that is probably not fully operational.Their high-quality deal flow also enables traditional fund managers to invest only in those 
firms that have the greatest promise of rapid growth, thus further maximizing the possibility 
of a highly profitable exit. 
While exits are challenging for all community development venture capitalists, they 
present a particular challenge for rurally-focused CDVC funds. In large part, this reflects the 
primarily low-tech, moderate-growth, early-stage firms in which rural CDVC funds invest as 
a result of their limited deal flow. Such companies are not likely to qualify for initial public 
offering and have fewer potential buyers (Rubin 2001). 
An additional factor complicating exits for CDVC funds is the unwillingness of many 
CDVC fund managers to force an exit that would be detrimental to their social objectives of 
high-quality job creation for low- and moderate-income individuals and economic develop-
ment for rural geographies. Managers of rurally-focused CDVC funds must always weigh the 
social and financial benefits of any exit opportunity against its social costs. If, for example, 
an acquiring firm closes down a facility or moves it to another location, the social benefits to 
a rural area, in the form of jobs created by that firm, would be negated. This would detract 
from the financial benefits that the exit might provide for the fund (Rubin 2001). 
As this section has demonstrated, the innovations rurally-focused CDVC funds have 
adopted to overcome the structural limitations of their environments have resulted in higher 
operating costs and lower financial returns. These have reinforced the difficulty these funds 
face in raising investment capital from the pension funds, endowments, financial institu-
tions, and wealthy individuals that make up the bulk of traditional venture capital investors. 
Such investors are interested primarily in profit-maximization and perceive rurally-focused 
CDVC funds’ commitment to a specific geography and their dual bottom line as diversions 
from that objective. 
To date, sources of capital for rural CDVCs have consisted of investors who prize the 
social objective primarily or equally with the financial one. These have consisted mostly of 
federal, state and local governments and foundations, as well as a few local utilities, wealthy 
individuals, and commercial banks aiming to fulfill their Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) obligations. These “social” sources of capital have been fairly limited in the dollars 
they were willing to invest in CDVC funds (Rubin forthcoming; Rubin 2001). 
The  difficulty  that  rurally-focused  CDVC  funds  have  encountered  in  raising  capital 
has left them with smaller capitalization levels than traditional venture funds. While the 
median fund size for a traditional fund is now $209 million (VentureOne 2006), most of 
the large CDVC funds raise between ten and twenty million dollars. Because they have 
less capital to invest, and because their portfolio companies lack the growth potential to 
justify a large investment, CDVC funds make smaller investments than traditional venture 
funds. However, venture capital costs are labor-based, driven by the number versus size of 
investments that fund managers must select and manage. Thus, rather than resulting in cost 
savings, the smaller fund and investment sizes of CDVCs have contributed to higher oper-
ating expenses as a percentage of investment capital (Rubin 2001). 
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to three percent of capital under management. While this is a substantial amount for a two 
hundred million dollar fund, it provides much less financial flexibility for a twenty million 
dollar one. Thus, most CDVC investors require a subsidy to fund their operations. This subsidy 
can take the form of lower salaries for CDVC fund managers, lower returns to investors, or 
foundation and government grants to a non-profit partner that provides technical assistance on 
behalf of the CDVC. Most rurally-focused CDVC funds require all three forms of subsidy. 
The  current  economic  and  political  environments  are  not  friendly  to  subsidy-based 
models (Rubin forthcoming). This has created significant challenges for the capitalization 
of new CDVC funds. The next section reviews existing sources of CDVC capital as well as 
potential new funding opportunities for the industry. 
Existing Sources of CDVC Capital
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund
The CDFI Fund of the U.S. Department of the Treasury is an important source of capital 
for community development venture capital. Under the Bush Administration, the Fund 
has seen a dramatic reduction in funding from $118 million in 2001, the last budget under 
President Clinton, to $55 million in 2006 (CDFI Coalition 2006). In addition to reducing 
overall funding levels, the administration also has limited the Fund’s flexibility in utilizing 
its allocation by pushing it to focus more of its resources on evaluation, and by prioritizing 
NMTC administration and the Bank Enterprise Award (BEA) program over other spending. 
For example, at least $11 million of the $55 million the Fund received for 2006 may be used 
for BEA and an additional $13.5 may be used for administration of the NMTC, leaving only 
$30 million for all other Fund activities. 
New Markets Venture Capital
The New Markets Venture Capital (NMVC) program was designed to increase the supply 
of equity and near-equity capital flowing into distressed communities. The program, which is 
administrated by the Small Business Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
was intended to provide 10 to 20 new NMVC Companies with matching capital -- $100 
million in debt for making investments and $30 million in grants to offset overhead expenses. 
The program would have resulted in a significant expansion of the financial resources avail-
able to the CDVC industry.
Six NMVC Companies were given final approval in the first round of the program, four 
of which included a focus on rural geographies. The SBA expected to run a second round of 
the program starting in the spring of 2003. In March of that year, however, funding for the 
second round was deleted from the 2003 Fiscal Year Omnibus Appropriations Bill during the 
budget reconciliation process. Efforts to obtain future allocations for the NMVC program 
have been unsuccessful to date. 
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The Rural Business Investment Program (RBIP) was designed to promote developmental 
venture capital investments in smaller enterprises located in rural areas. It was created by 
the 2002 Farm Bill and modeled on the NMVC program. The original legislation indicated 
that the program would make available approximately $280 million of investment as well as 
operational grants to provide technical assistance to portfolio companies. In 2003, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture reached an agreement with the SBA to have the latter administer 
the program. 
The 2005 budget allocated $10 million for the program, which would have supported two 
to three Rural Business Investment Companies. The SBA conditionally approved three RBIP 
Companies, giving them a year to raise the $10 million in equity capital required to become 
fully approved. Upon full approval, each of the companies would have been eligible for 
$20 million of government guaranteed debentures for making investments and a $1 million 
operational assistance grant for the provision of technical assistance to those companies that 
received investments. 
Only one of the three, Meritus Ventures, was able to raise the necessary capital and 
become a Rural Business Investment Company. The Budget Reconciliation Act of 2005 
subsequently  rescinded  funds  appropriated  for  the  program  that  were  not  obligated  by 
October 1, 2006 and repealed the authority to spend funds in the future, ending any future 
funding for the program. 
New Markets Tax Credit Program
The New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) program was designed to combine public and 
private sector resources in order to bring $15 billion in new investments to impoverished 
rural and urban communities. The program came into existence with strong encouragement 
and support from the CDVC industry. When the program was being designed, there was 
great hope that it would be a significant new source of equity capital to fund business lending 
and investments. Due to several statutory and regulatory provisions, however, the program 
has so far been used almost exclusively to finance real estate-related transactions (Rubin & 
Stankiewicz 2005; 2003). The highly competitive nature of the program and the expense and 
expertise required to meet its legal and compliance requirements have also precluded all but 
the largest and most sophisticated organizations from being able to take advantage of an 
NMTC allocation. 
Conventional Financial Institutions
Commercial banks have been a very important source of capital for CDVCs, particu-
larly since the 1995 regulatory revisions to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which 
instituted the investment test and expressly recognized community development financial 
institutions as qualifying CRA investments and borrowers (Barr 2005; Pinsky 2001). Both of 
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Rubin and Zeilenbach 2004). Recent changes to the CRA, however, have reduced the number 
of banks expressly evaluated for their investment activities. This change, in combination with 
the dramatic consolidation in the banking industry and the growth of alternative options 
that meet the investment test while providing a market-rate return, has made it much more 
difficult for CDVCs to raise capital from banks. 
The CRA was passed by Congress in 1977 in order to encourage regulated financial insti-
tutions to meet their “continuing and affirmative obligations to help meet the credit needs 
of the local communities in which they are chartered” (NCRC 2005). In 2004 and 2005, 
the four federal agencies that enforce the CRA issued amendments to the Act that, in part, 
created a new category known as intermediate small banks, which consists of institutions 
with assets of between $250 million and $1 billion, which would no longer be evaluated on 
their investment and service activities. Instead they would be eligible for evaluation under 
the small bank lending test and a flexible new community development test. The new regula-
tions did not change the evaluations for banks with assets of more than $ 1 billion or less 
than $250 million (Marsico 2006).
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition found that as a result of the interme-
diate small bank category changes “1,508 banks with 13,643 branches and total assets of $679 
billion were no longer subject to the more rigorous lending, investment, and service tests for 
large banks” (Marsico 2006, 540). This has significant implications for CDVCs. The CRA 
investment test has played a critical role in motivating banks to invest in the industry (Rubin 
forthcoming; Benjamin, Rubin and Zeilenbach 2004). Any reduction in the number of banks 
that must meet the investment test makes raising new CDVC funds more challenging. This is 
particularly true for rural-focused CDVC funds, which were already disadvantaged in being 
able to attract bank investments because of the paucity of larger bank branches in rural areas 
(Rubin 2001). 
Over the last few decades, the U.S. banking industry has gone through significant consol-
idation through mergers of increasingly large organizations. The ten biggest US commercial 
banks now control 49 percent of all domestic banking assets, a substantial increase from the 
29 percent they controlled a decade ago (Economist 2006). 
This consolidation has had both positive and negative affects for the CDVC industry. 
On the positive side, banks planning to acquire or be acquired have been more likely to be 
concerned about their CRA rating and thus to make community-development related invest-
ments, even unprofitable ones (Bostic et al 2002; Avery et al 2000). This benefit has been 
watered down somewhat by the recent decrease in large-bank mergers. 
One of the negative consequences of consolidation has been a reduction in absolute 
sources of capital for community development finance that occurs when large institutions 
merge. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the post-merger institutions do not provide as 
much community development capital as the total of what the two merging entities did 
separately, resulting in a reduction of overall capital availability. Mergers among larger banks 
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being able to obtain a capital commitment. 
Bank consolidation also has resulted in an increased emphasis on profitability by the 
larger banks, which have felt pressure to justify the mergers to their shareholders. This has 
led them to consolidate activities and cut costs (Tully 2006). The increased profitability pres-
sures have translated into less subsidized capital available for CDVCs as banks increasingly 
view their CRA-related activities as profit centers (Rubin forthcoming). This is made easier 
by the recent increase in investment options created specifically for the purpose of providing 
financial institutions with market-rate or near-market-rate returns while enabling them to 
receive investment test or similar credit under the CRA. These include mutual funds, such as 
the Access Capital Community Investment Fund and the CRA Qualified Investment Fund, 
which invests in economically and geographically targeted fixed income instruments. They 
also include separately managed accounts that groups such as CRA Fund Advisors can set up 
to suit the particular investment objectives of banks, pension funds, and foundations.
Even  developmental  venture  capital  alternatives  have  mushroomed.  The  minority-
focused venture capital industry has grown significantly in the last decade (Bradford, Bates 
and Rubin 2005), and funds such as UrbanAmerica, LP, the Canyon-Johnson Urban Fund, 
and the Genesis Family of Funds invest in inner-city real estate with the goal of achieving 
both market-rate returns and economic development for their under-served residents. These 
options pose a significant competitive challenge for CDVCs by promising investors higher 
rates of financial return for comparable levels of risk. 
CDVCs seeking bank investments must also contend with higher interest rates, which 
translate into a higher cost of capital for banks, and subsequently for their borrowers. Higher 
interest rates mean banks are looking for higher rates of return on equity investments to 
offset the higher cost of capital. This makes CDVCs a tougher sell, since they have yet to 
document sufficient financial returns to justify their longer holding periods. 
The losses that many banks experienced from their Small Business Investment Company 
(SBIC) investments following the market correction of 2001 have also hurt CDVCs’ ability 
to raise capital. Although CDVCs have not pursued the internet-related investments that led 
so many SBICs to lose money, they have been hurt by the connection some bankers have 
made between them and SBICs, as equity investments in both enable banks to meet the 
CRA investment test (Rubin forthcoming). 
Foundations 
Foundations have been a small but important source of capital for CDVCs. Over the last 
decade, a handful of large foundations, including The Ford Foundation, The John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the F.B. Heron Foundation, have made numerous 
investments  in  the  industry,  while  others  have  supported  specific  organizations  and/or 
initiatives. 
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has declined. This is due partly to the stock market decline that began in 2000, which shrank 
foundation assets and led to an overall reduction in foundation giving. More significant, 
however, have been decisions by the most active foundation investors to change the nature 
of their support for the sector or to withdraw support entirely. Foundations generally view 
their dollars as seed money, intended to catalyze other sources of capital and ultimately lead 
to organizational or project sustainability. For CDVCs, this has meant that the subsidized 
dollars that foundations provided to many organizations in the industry’s beginnings have 
become rare or unavailable. 
Even those few foundations that have continued to fund individual CDVCs evaluate 
these investments relative to the range of other community development options available, 
such as the fixed instrument and equity funds discussed previously. As one foundation offi-
cial pointed out, “There has been a lot of activity in the last five years and its reshaped the 
landscape a lot and signaled to foundations and banks that they can have the same impact 
with a better return” (Rubin forthcoming). 
Nor do the dollars that foundations commit to CDVCs from their charitable disburse-
ments equal those they invest in more market-rate funds via their endowments. This is true 
even for those foundations, such as F. B. Heron, which commit a portion of their endowment 
investments to mission related opportunities. In 2004, for example, the foundation invested 
$1.5 million in four CDVC funds via program related investments, and $10 million of 
endowment funds in six socially-oriented market-rate equity funds, such as UrbanAmerica, 
L.P. (F.B. Heron 2004). 
New CDVC Funding Opportunities 
State and Local Governments
State and local governments have been a source of capital for CDVCs since the industry’s 
beginnings, accounting for eleven percent of all capital raised by the industry as of the end 
of 2000 (Rubin 2001). As alternative sources have dried up, however, states have become 
an increasingly attractive option for CDVC funds trying to raise new capital. This may be 
particularly true for rurally-focused CDVC funds, as state governments may be closer and 
thus more accountable to their rural constituents than the federal government. 
The power of state-level initiatives is best illustrated by California, where public-sector 
activity over the last decade has encouraged the creation of numerous innovative sources 
of capital to fund community development finance. In 1996, The Community Organized 
Investment Network (COIN) was established in the state at the request of the insurance 
industry as an alternative to state legislation that would have required insurance companies 
to invest in underserved communities. As of 2003, it had facilitated over $740 million in 
insurer investments in affordable housing and economic development projects. The COIN 
program also certifies California Community Development Financial Institutions, which 
then become eligible for investments from the COIN managed pool of capital. 
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Investing in California’s Emerging Markets initiative, “to direct investment capital – through 
state programs and the State’s pension and investment funds – to spur economic growth 
in those California communities left behind during the economic expansion of the past 
decade” (Angelides 2001, 1). As part of this initiative, Angelides successfully encouraged 
the boards of two of California’s largest public pension funds, on which he serves, to invest 
in real estate and businesses in the state’s poorest communities. The two pension funds, 
the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and the California State 
Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS), have so far allocated $4.34 billion to real estate and 
$1.09 billion to business investments in such communities (Angelides 2006). 
One indication of how successful these initiatives have been is a forthcoming report by 
the Milken Institute that found—contrary to national trends—that developmental finance 
institutions in the state are not experiencing any difficulty raising capital (Zeidman 2006). 
Not surprisingly, the three-year-old Bay Area Equity Fund, the largest CDVC fund raised to 
date, is based in California.
Pension Funds
U.S. pension funds control over seven trillion dollars in assets (Anand 1998). Historically, 
most pension fund assets have been very conservatively invested in fixed income, public 
equities and real estate. In the last few decades, however, pension funds have expanded their 
parameters to include “alternative” investments such as venture capital. Pension funds now 
account for over 50 percent of all the capital placed in venture funds (National Venture 
Capital Association 2006). 
Some of the public and Taft-Hartley pension funds have also incorporated economically 
targeted investments (ETIs) into their portfolios. ETIs are “investment programs designed 
to produce a competitive rate of return as well as create collateral economic benefits for 
a  targeted  geographic  area,  group  of  people,  or  sector  of  the  economy”  (McNeill  and 
Fullenbaum 1995 as quoted by Small Business Administration, 1). Conservative estimates 
place the ETI commitments of public pension funds at more than $43 million (Democracy 
Collaborative 2005). 
To date, most of the pension fund ETI investments have been in fixed income and real 
estate. Pension funds generally have been reluctant to make private equity ETI investments, 
for reasons of both cost and risk. Only a few of the most innovative pension funds have 
expanded their ETI investments to include private equity. The most notable among these 
is the CalPERS’ $500 million California Initiative to target companies in the state’s under-
served markets (Hess 2006). In 2001, the California Initiative selected ten private equity firms 
to receive a capital commitment of $475 million (Hess 2006). Pacific Community Ventures, 
a San Francisco based CDVC, was among these ten and received a $10 million investment 
(Pacific Community Ventures 2005). The CalPERS investment makes Pacific Community 
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investments from Taft-Hartley pension funds for its CDVC funds (Kostelni 2003). 
While pension investments in CDVCs are still the exception, they are likely to increase if 
the CDVC funds can demonstrate an appropriate risk-adjusted rate of return and an ability 
to absorb larger investments. Despite CalPERS’ willingness to invest $10 million in Pacific 
Community Ventures, pension funds generally prefer to make larger investments as the costs 
of due diligence are the same regardless of investment size. 
More pension funds also are adding private equity to their ETI portfolios, including the 
New York City Employees’ Retirement System (NYCERS), which set out a policy in August 
of 2005 to move into private equity investments and to target low-moderate income areas in 
the five boroughs of New York City (Hess and Hagerman 2005). Given the geographic nature 
of most public pension fund ETI investments, community development venture capital 
funds that invest in states whose public pension funds are willing to make private equity ETI 
investments have a much greater chance of attracting pension fund capital. 
 
Individual Investors 
Although some CDVC funds have been able to attract investments from individuals, 
they accounted for only six percent of all CDVC investments as of 2000, the last year for which 
this data is available. As the field of social investing continues to evolve, however, CDVCs 
increasingly are looking at individuals as a potentially important source of future capital. 
Individuals can invest directly in most limited-life CDVC funds (those structured as 
limited partnership or limited liability corporations) via equity investments of $50,000 or 
more (MacDonald 2005). SJF Ventures, a fund that invests in companies whose competitive 
advantages include environmental or workforce innovation, has found individual investors 
increasing receptive to investing in its funds. Many of these individuals have experience as angel 
investors and have found it easier and safer to invest via a CDVC. Although their investments 
are generally smaller than those of commercial banks, such individuals are high value-added 
investors because they provide additional due diligence on individual deals and refer potential 
portfolio companies to the fund. Individuals also can invest in CDVCs via the Community 
Development Venture Capital Alliance, the industry’s trade association, which has a central 
fund that accepts individual loans of as little as $10,000 for a period of ten years. 
Conclusion
Given the important role that patient capital plays in entrepreneurial development, the 
future economic vitality of rural communities rests, at least in part, on their ability to access 
such capital. Community development venture capital is a particularly adept model for 
overcoming the structural obstacles that rural geographies present for venture capital inves-
tors. This model, however, requires subsidy to offset the extra costs that overcoming such 
obstacles involves. 
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and commercial banks, have all declined since the 1990s, making it extremely challenging for 
new CDVC funds to form. Changes in public policy are necessary to encourage the federal 
government and commercial banks to continue their support for the industry.
There also are several funding sources that could play a greater role in capitalizing new 
CDVC funds, including state governments, pensions funds, and individual investors. Once 
again, public policy is essential in providing incentives for these actors to play a greater role. 
As the California example demonstrates, a well-coordinated policy approach can result in 
significant resources for economic development from the public and private sectors, which 
helps create healthy and vibrant communities. 
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